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Abstract
An increasing share of firms’ borrowing occurs through bond markets. We present
high-frequency evidence from the Eurozone that bond-reliant firms are more respon-
sive to monetary shocks: in contrast to standard bank lending channel predictions,
unexpected ECB policy changes affect their stock prices by more, even conditional on
total debt and industry fixed-effects. We develop an organizing framework to decom-
pose the stock price, credit risk and investment response of large firms. We emphasize
the role of corporate liquidity management: firms react to rate hikes by being prudent in
good times, reducing investment in favor of hoarding liquid assets. Since bond financ-
ing is less flexible in bad times than relationship banking, this effect can rationalize why
the mix of bank and bond financing matters for monetary transmission. A mitigating
force is that bonds generally have longer duration and lower interest-rate pass-through
relative to loans. Our findings suggest that the recent global growth in bond debt fol-
lowing quantitative easing could interact with conventional interest rate policy going
forward.
Keywords: Monetary policy, ECB, Debt Structure, Bank loans, Corporate bonds
JEL codes: E44, E52, G21, G23
1 Introduction
Most macroeconomic aggregates—such as investment, output or employment—are de-
termined by firm decisions and influenced by monetary policy. Given that changes to
the policy rate directly affect the cost of external financing, it is plausible that firms’ fi-
nancial liabilities play an important role.1 A (multiform) "bank lending channel" is the
pre-dominant view to understand the financial transmission of monetary policy. How-
ever, bond debt has been rising at the expense of bank lending in recent years. Europe is
a striking example of this rapid growth: although its bond markets were historically less
developed than in the U.S., according to the European Commission, the share of market
financing almost doubled between 2000 and 2016. Whether monetary transmission de-
pends on the bond-bank share is therefore an open important question. Indeed, the stock
of bond debt has become a major concern for central bankers.2
Importantly, bond financing and bank loans are not perfect substitutes: the corporate
finance literature emphasizes that market debt is more rigid and harder to renegotiate
relative to bank loans, or "relationship financing" (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). Unlike
bonds, bank loans are provided by levered intermediaries with significant liquidity mis-
match. Moreover, bonds and loans tend to have different contractual characteristics, such
as maturity, interest rate fixation, or seniority among others. Even though bond financing
reduces the exposure of the economy to problems in the banking sector, little is known
about the role it plays in the transmission of other aggregate shocks, and, in particular,
monetary policy. On the empirical front, investigating this channel is nevertheless chal-
lenging because monetary policy is endogenous and correlated with many drivers of firm
choices, which obfuscates identification (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018b). The concep-
tual front is equally challenging: there are multiple channels for which the difference
between bonds and loans can matter for monetary transmission.
This paper makes two contributions. First, it provides high-frequency evidence on the
1Indeed, a growing number of papers have emphasized the role of firm liabilities in shaping the response
of the economy to aggregate shocks (Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina (2012), Giroud and Mueller
(2017), Crouzet (2017), Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid (2016) or Ottonello and Winberry (2018)).
2The January 2019 minutes of the FOMC state that "the build-up in overall nonfinancial business debt to
levels close to historical highs relative to GDP was viewed as a factor that could amplify adverse shocks to
the business sector." The President of the Federal Reserve of Dallas recently claimed: "As a central banker,
I am carefully tracking the growth in BBB and less-than-investment-grade debt. In a downturn, some
proportion of BBB bonds maybe at risk of being downgraded, creating dislocations."
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role of firms’ debt composition for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the
Eurozone. Using stock market reactions to monetary policy shocks, we show that firms
with more bond debt are disproportionately affected by unexpected ECB interest rate
changes. This fact survives a myriad of robustness checks and holds within sectors and
controlling for total debt. Interestingly, this pattern is difficult to rationalize with existing
theories of the bank lending channel, as well as with explanations based on duration,
since bonds are predominantly long-term, fixed-rate liabilities. The second contribution
is therefore to provide an organizing framework to decompose the response of large firms.
We introduce the rigidity of outstanding bond debt, as emphasized in canonical models of
bank versus market financing, as a key channel for monetary transmission via corporate
liquidity management. Intuitively, rate hikes drain cash-flows and increase exposure to
temporary shocks. Firms react by being prudent in good times, reducing investment in
favor of hoarding liquid assets. Since bonds are harder to renegotiate in bad times relative
to relationship banking, this effect can rationalize our main finding. Going forward, the
recent growth in corporate bond issuance following quantitative easing and stricter bank
regulation can thus interact with conventional monetary policy.
To investigate empirically the role of debt composition in the transmission of mon-
etary policy, we construct a panel that combines information on ECB announcements,
asset prices and firm balance sheet and financing choices in the Eurozone. Our empiri-
cal strategy is based on high-frequency identification that leverages both time series and
cross-sectional variation. We focus on conventional monetary policy between 2001 to
2007, from the early years of the Euro to the beginning of the financial crisis. We follow
Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018) and construct identified monetary policy shocks us-
ing quasi-intraday data on interest swaps. These shocks capture the surprise content of
ECB announcements and are hence little affected by general macro-economic information
that did not fall on that specific time window of the day. We combine this time series of
identified monetary shocks with cross-sectional variation at the firm level. We use the
firm’s short-term stock market response to measure its exposure to monetary policy, and
ultimately merge balance sheet information with comprehensive corporate bond issuance
data to measure a firm’s reliance on bond financing.
We find strong evidence that debt composition matters for the transmission of mon-
etary policy: firms with more bond debt are relatively more affected by surprise interest
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rate changes. Importantly, we control for total debt and sector-specific sensitivity to mon-
etary policy.3 Quantitatively, following a one percentage point increase in interest rates,
firms in the bottom quartile of the bonds over assets distribution have a 2.3 percentage
point lower stock return relative to firms in the top quartile.4 This echoes Crouzet and
Mehrotra (2017) who show that firms with access to public debt markets display a higher
sensitivity to recessions. A number of robustness tests confirm this fact. Moreover, the
strong forecasting power of bond debt for the cross-sectional response is not affected by
the inclusion of traditional balance sheet covariates that are thought to drive bond financ-
ing or the response to monetary policy.
What economic mechanism can explain this special role of bond debt in transmitting
monetary policy? Two canonical class of explanations have difficulty to rationalize this
finding. The first relates to the (multiform) bank lending channel, often phrased in terms
of an interest rate pass-through to borrowers (Wang, Whited, Wu, and Xiao, 2018). Because
banks are levered intermediaries issuing liquid deposits to fund illiquid loans, they are
affected by monetary policy in specific ways.5 However, irrespective of the exact channel,
this class of explanation would imply, opposite to our main findings, that bond-reliant
firms are relatively less responsive. A second set of explanations focuses on duration:
market values are forward looking and thus sensitive to changes in the discount rate.
Duration is key to the asset pricing literature (Gormsen and Lazarus, 2019), as well as to
the standard "balance sheet channel", in which rate hikes depress collateral values and
reduce borrowing capacity. Once again, this force goes in the opposite direction of our
findings, as bonds have longer duration relative to loans, as well as being less likely to be
collateralized.
We provide an organizing framework to show that the rigidity of bonds relative to
bank loans, a defining feature of market financing, has the potential to rationalize our
findings. Bonds are held by a dispersed base of investors, which makes renegotiation
difficult due to a coordination problem across creditors (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996).
3A number of potential transmission channels of monetary policy can affect firms indirectly, indepen-
dently from their liabilities. Important examples include changes to consumer demand or labor supply.
However, it is plausible that those channels operate mainly at the sector level and would be netted out in a
within-sector, across-firm specification.
4The sample standard deviation of stock returns on monetary announcement days is 2.5%.
5Classical views stress the role of reserves and capital, while more recent theories emphasize market
power (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2017), floating loan rates (Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive, 2018),
or interest coverage covenants (Greenwald, 2019).
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Relative to banking relationships, market financing is less flexible in bad times and leave
firms more exposed to temporary cash-flow shocks and the risk of financial distress and
illiquidity (Crouzet, 2017; Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli, 2016; De Fiore and
Uhlig, 2015).6 This key difference between bonds and loans matters for firms’ liquidity
management problem in which investment, debt and cash hoarding policies are jointly de-
termined in a forward-looking manner to avoid financial distress. Corporate liquidity has
been recently recognized an important force in monetary transmission,7 and our frame-
work introduces the rigidity of market debt by extending Holmström and Tirole (1998)
while nesting the canonical channels.
The framework delivers three results. First, we decompose the firms’ response to
a change in interest rates as three terms representing the duration, interest rate pass-
through and liquidity management channel, respectively. The decomposition holds for
the stock price, as well as investment, liquid assets and credit risk. The intuition be-
hind the liquidity management channel is as follows: rate hikes drain cash-flows, which
increase exposure to potential future temporary shocks. Firms react to this increase in
liquidity risk by being prudent in good times, reducing investment in favor of hoard-
ing liquid assets. Importantly, this type of "rating management" operates even though
firms are far from their borrowing constraints and financial distress. Second, we use this
decomposition to explain why the effect of monetary policy can vary across firms with
different sources of financing. In terms of stock price reaction, the duration and inter-
est rate pass-through suggests that bond-reliant firms should be less responsive while
the liquidity management channel predict otherwise. Indeed, since bonds are harder to
renegotiate in bad times relative to relationship banking, bond-reliant firm have a higher
shadow value of liquidity ceteris paribus. The total effect is conceptually ambiguous, but
our evidence suggests that the latter dominates in the Eurozone. Finally, we show how
debt composition matters for the response of real variables to monetary policy. While
6The rigidity of bond debt is the backbone of existing theories of bank loans versus bonds, or relationship
versus market financing. Moreover, there is ample evidence that bank loans are significantly easier to
renegotiate than bonds (Gilson, John, and Lang, 1990; Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein, 1994; Denis and
Mihov, 2003).
7See for example Rocheteau, Wright, and Zhang (2018), Kiyotaki and Moore (2018) or Altavilla, Burlon,
Giannetti, and Holton (2019). Outside of the corporate sector, recent works argue that liquidity manage-
ment in the financial sector is key for monetary transmission (Bianchi and Bigio, 2014; Drechsler, Savov, and
Schnabl, 2018; Choi, Eisenbach, and Yorulmazer, 2015). Moreover, Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018) shows
that household liquidity constraints drive the effect of monetary policy in a quantitative HANK model.
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liquidity concerns amplify the standard reduction in investment, the effect on liquid as-
sets and credit risk is less sharp. The prudent behavior of firms implies that a deteriora-
tion in financial positions is endogenously contained via preventive measures. Interpreting
reduced-form evidence on slow-moving variables can therefore be difficult without the
lens of a model.
The key implication of our findings is that macroeconomic models would benefit from
featuring debt structure more prominently, and in particular the mix of bonds and bank
loans. Sources of external financing are not perfect substitutes and the underlying trade-
offs affect the pass-through of monetary policy. For large firms, investment, debt and
liquidity policies are jointly determined. "Financial frictions" are best modeled as a liq-
uidity management problem, in which firms plan ahead in order to avoid future financial
distress, as opposed to simple borrowing constraints binding in every period. Recogniz-
ing the richness of firms’ long-term debt obligations is therefore key to gauge the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy. Moreover, policy is naturally path-dependent: existing debt
structure is driven by past financing patterns, which are in turn driven by past policies.
Following episodes of quantitative easing and low long-term interest rates, a large share
of economy now relies on corporate bonds, a trend that influences conventional interest
rate policy going forward.
Related literature
This paper relates to literature on the macroeconomic implications of corporate debt struc-
ture, and, more specifically, on the choice between bond and bank debt. Crouzet (2017)
and Crouzet (2014) show that the optimal mix of bonds versus loans varies in the cross-
section of firms and has implications for investment dynamics. Crouzet and Mehrotra
(2017) find that U.S. bond issuers are more sensitive to recessions. De Fiore and Uhlig
(2015, 2011) also study the choice of debt type in a macroeconomic context and show that
it played a role in Europe during the financial crisis. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1996)
and Bolton and Freixas (2006) suggest that monetary policy pass-through depends on
the composition of external finance, although the mechanism is very different. Lhuissier
and Szczerbowicz (2018) provide recent evidence that monetary policy influences firms’
choice of debt structure.
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We stress the role of bond debt rigidity, following classical theoretical (Bolton and
Scharfstein, 1996; Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992) and empirical work. We further comple-
ment the literature that shows how policies stimulating bond markets can have aggre-
gate effects through the substitution of bank loans toward bonds (Balloch, 2018; Grosse-
Rueschkamp, Steffen, and Streitz, 2019; Arce, Gimeno, and Mayordomo, 2018). We re-
late to extensive literature on corporate liquidity management (see Almeida, Campello,
Cunha, and Weisbach (2014) for a survey), and particularly to recent works stressing the
role of corporate finance in monetary transmission (Rocheteau, Wright, and Zhang, 2018;
Acharya and Plantin, 2019; Cloyne, Ferreira, Froemel, and Surico, 2018).
In terms of its findings, this paper aligns with the growing consensus that monetary
policy transmission is heterogeneous across firms, and specifically that financial positions
play a role. For instance, Ottonello and Winberry (2018) show that leverage and distance
to default drives U.S. firm investment reactions to monetary shocks, while Jeenas (2018)
emphasizes the role of cash holdings. Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018) provide
evidence on a floating rate channel of monetary policy in the United States. Gomes, Jer-
mann, and Schmid (2016) and De Fiore, Teles, and Tristani (2011) present macroeconomic
models of monetary policy with a focus on firm external financing. Greenwald (2019)
describes a covenant channel of monetary transmission. Our paper is also related to
the literature on the bank lending channel of monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein, 2000;
Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina, 2012), the link between corporate default with the
macroeconomy (Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev, 2014; Bhamra, Kuehn, and
Strebulaev, 2010), reaching for yields in the bond market (Becker and Ivashina, 2015) as
well as the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (Paligorova and Santos, 2017).
In term of its approach, this paper relies on high-frequency identification of mone-
tary policy shocks (Cook and Hahn, 1989; Kuttner, 2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002;
Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005a; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a; Corsetti, Duarte, and
Mann, 2018). The most related work in this area describes heterogeneous reactions of
stocks to high-frequency monetary shocks based on a broad set of balance sheet charac-
teristics (Ozdagli (2018), Ozdagli and Velikov (2018) and Haitsma, Unalmis, and de Haan
(2016)), while Andreson and Cesa-Bianchi (2018) studies the response of credit spreads.
In contrast, we focus on the role of bond financing.
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2 Background and Data
2.1 Monetary policy in the Eurozone
The main focus of our empirical analysis is on conventional monetary policy in the Eu-
rozone between 2001 and 2007. During this period, the Euro is well-established as a
currency and the financial turmoil preceding the Great Recession has not yet reached the
continent8. Moreover, the period covers a full monetary cycle, as can be seen in Figure 1
which displays the main ECB refinancing rate.
Needless to say, the stance of monetary policy is influenced by economic conditions
and interest rates are correlated with many macroeconomic aggregates. To estimate the
effect of monetary policy on firms, we therefore construct identified monetary policy us-
ing high-frequency data on asset prices.
Construction of monetary shocks: We follow Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018) and
construct a time series of monetary policy shocks using quasi-intraday data on overnight
interest swaps (OIS swaps). OIS swaps exchange the overnight rate, EONIA, against a
fixed rate for an agreed period. At the point of contracting, the fixed rate represents the
geometric average of the expected overnight rate over the contract period. In other words,
the fixed rate is the average of the rate at the short end of the yield curve—the primary in-
strument for conventional monetary policy. OIS swaps represent an attractive alternative
to futures on the overnight rate which are commonly used in the U.S. for high-frequency
identification of monetary policy. Lloyd (2017) finds that the OIS swap rates accurately
measure expectations of future short-term interest rates at a horizon between 1 and 24
month in the Eurozone until 09/2007.9 Following Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018), we
exploit the closing times of the Tokyo and London stock exchange to obtain changes in
the OIS swap rate in a tight time frame around the monetary policy announcement time.
Specifically, we construct the monetary policy shock as the difference in the fixed rate
8The Euro was formally introduced on 01/01/1999 which locked all national currencies at a fixed rate
to the Euro. Contemporaneously the ECB started to set its target rate. The initial period was associated
with great operational and policy uncertainty as reflected by ECB’s decision to narrow the corridor of its
main refinancing rate. For this reason, we allow for some phasing in. The end of the sample period, July
2007, is dictated by the stress in the money market that renders the OIS swap rate uninformative about
ECB’s monetary policy stance. For a discussion of monetary transmission below the zero lower bound, see
Heider, Saidi, and Schepens (2018)
9The Eurozone money market underwent significant stress post 09/2007; we have chosen the sample
period that the identified monetary shocks are unaffected by this.
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of the 1-month OIS swap in the 6 hour (13.00–19.00 CET) window surrounding the ECB
monetary policy announcement. Using this procedure, a positive shock corresponds to a
surprise increase, i.e., a monetary tightening. Closing data from the Tokyo and London
stock exchange are obtained via Bloomberg.
There are 92 ECB meetings between January 2001 and July 2007. The shock is sum-
marized in Figure 2 and Table 1. Many shocks are a few basis points, suggesting that
monetary policy announcements were anticipated by the market. On the other hand,
there were a significant number of occasions when the ECB conference contained unex-
pected information. Some of these shocks had a magnitude of ten to twenty basis points,
which is large given that rate changes are typically twenty five basis points, and are con-
centrated in the first half of the sample. The rate cut following the September 11th attack
is an outlier, with a surprise of forty basis points. While there is reason to believe that
this was a genuine monetary shock in Europe, our results are robust to excluding this
particular day. We also present robustness to using other definitions of monetary shocks,
such as, daily differences in the EURIBOR or OIS rate.
Aggregate and sector-level evidence: To validate the economic significance of our
shock for firms, we show that it significantly impacts stock markets. We run daily re-
gressions of different stock market indices on our monetary shock series. We consider
Eurozone-wide, national, as well as sector indices. Table 1 presents summary statistics
for index returns on monetary policy announcement days and other days. Panel A of
Table 2 shows evidence at the aggregate stock market level. By and large, Eurozone and
national indices react strongly to surprise monetary announcements. Panel B of Table
2 shows that the effect is heterogeneous across industries, an effect we explore in more
detail in our main firm-level analysis below.
Firm-level data: We combine different data sources in order to create a panel of Eu-
ropean firms during our period of interest. Balance sheet items come from Thomson
Reuters Worldscope and stock information from Datastream. Information on bond is-
suance comes from SDC Platinum. An alternative to the balance sheet information from
Worldscope is the Capital IQ database. Capital IQ contains more granular information
regarding the debt structure of firms than what is present in Worldscope.10 One draw-
10Note that we cannot measure bank debt directly. For clarity of exposition, we nevertheless sometimes
refer to non-bond debt as bank debt. In practice, most non-bond long-term debt issued by corporation is
typically relationship financing, in the forms of credit lines, term loans or capital leases.
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back of Capital IQ is that it gained increasing popularity more recently which makes its
coverage limited and somewhat unreliable towards the beginning of our sample. We
use it primarily as an additional source to validate the construction of some of the debt
variables.11
From a methodological point of view, investigating the transmission of monetary pol-
icy through firms is complicated by the fact that both ECB and firms choices are affected
by overlapping aggregate factors. The solution we take in this paper is to follow an high-
frequency identification strategy and study short-term changes in asset prices. Specifi-
cally, a stock price reaction to unexpected ECB announcements can be used to measure
how affected a firm is by monetary policy, while limiting the effects of confounding fac-
tors. By design, the analysis therefore focuses on publicly listed firms whose stocks are
traded in an exchange. Moreover, it is necessary for the analysis to have enough power
that the stocks of these firms are sufficiently liquid. Otherwise, information from ECB an-
nouncements might be slowly incorporated in prices, compromising identification. This
is an important concern in Europe, where many publicly listed stocks are traded infre-
quently.
For this reason, we construct our sample of firms in the following way. For each date,
we restrict attention to firms which are part of one of the EURO STOXX sectoral stock in-
dices, excluding financials and utilities. Together these indices constitute over three quar-
ters of the market capitalization of listed firms in the Eurozone. Because the constituents
list of each index is outside of the researcher’s control, using this criterion for inclusion in
the sample has at least two advantages. First, it leads to an unbalanced panel to automat-
ically accounts for mergers and acquisition, as well as, the rise of new industry leaders
and fall of former incumbents. Second, it guarantees that these firms are perceived as the
largest actors of their respective sectors and are monitored carefully by analysts and mar-
ket participants during the day. In both dimensions, we do not have to rely on an arbitrary
cut on, say, firm size or price volatility to select our sample of firms.12 This leaves us with
an unbalanced panel of 260 firms between 2001 and 2007.13 As evidence that our firm
11Our measure of bond debt from SDC is over 85% correlated with that of Capital IQ.
12Nevertheless, although avoiding injecting researchers’ subjectivity into the analysis is beneficial, it does
not mean that the selection procedure is absolutely free of bias.
13As an alternative to the preceding selection based on indices, we selected the top 500 firms by market
capitalization in each year. This yields a broader sample with 635 distinct firms. The main results are very
similar for this sample and can be requested from the authors.
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panel captures the relevant macro variation, Table 9 in the Online Appendix shows that
we can replicate the aggregate stock market results in weighted firm-level regressions.
2.2 Summary Statistics
Four striking patterns emerge, as can be seen in the summary statistics in Table 3 and
the corresponding histograms in Figure 4. The first fact is that there is considerable het-
erogeneity in firms financial positions and debt mix. Even within our sample of large
European public firms, debt to assets ratio ranges from 16% at the 25th percentile to 36%
at the 75th percentile. Similarly, the fraction of debt that is due within one year varies
analogously: from 16% to 48% moving from the first to the third quartile.
Second, the median median bond debt to asset ratio is relatively low at 5% in the Eu-
rozone. This is a well-documented fact, sometimes referred as a European “bank bias”
(Langfield and Pagano, 2016). The low level persists today in spite of some recent up-
ward trend and convergence to the United States.14 Institutional and historical reasons
have been put forward to explain this difference. In this paper, we take it as given and
exploit the fact that a substantial fraction of large European firms rely on bank financing.
Note also that credit ratings have a significantly smaller penetration relative to the United
States. For instance, the ECB estimates that in 2004 only about 11% of firms with turnover
over e50M have an S&P rating, compared to 92% in the United States15.
Going forward, it is convenient to classify firms in the Eurozone into three even-sized
categories that correspond to the three terciles of bond debt over debt ratios. The first
group has (virtually) no bond debt: the 75th percentile has zero bond debt, and the mean
holds only two percent of its debt in bonds. The middle category has low bond debt: the
median bond debt over debt is 25%. The last category has high bond debt: for the median
firm, bonds represents 64% of its total debt.
Finally, all firms, including those with high bond debt, are potentially exposed to
changes in interest rates. In addition to the mechanical pass-through of interest rates
for floating rate debt, firms’ valuation is affected by potential discount rate changes in-
duced by monetary policy. A summary statistic of how sensitive the valuation of debt
14Between 2000 and 2016, the share of bond financing for nonfinancial corporations increased from 9 to
17 per cent in Europe, versus 19 to 34 per cent in the United States (McKinsey, 2018).
15Von Beschwitz and Howells (2016)
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liabilities is to interest rate changes is duration. Interestingly, floating rate debt securities
tend to have shorter duration; and hence are less sensitive to interest rate changes, since
the cash flow effect and the discount rate effect, at least, partially offset each other. As
a consequence, floating rate debt tends to have a larger cash flow effect but interest rate
changes affect the debt valuation less. Overall, we see a rich debt structure in our sample,
that is, firms have significant amounts of short-term and long-term debt and bank and
bond debt. Figure 5 illustrates the median debt structure for each of three categories of
bond dependence. For instance, even in the high bond debt category, almost a quarter of
debt is due within a year and roughly 40% of its debt is not in the form of bonds. This sug-
gests that bond financing does not insulate the firms from the cash flow risk induced by
changes in interest rates.16 This an important ingredient of the bond debt rigidity channel
we discuss in the framework below.
2.3 Drivers of bank versus bond financing
It is important to note that in our setting, a firm’s debt mix is not randomly assigned: the
decision to access bond or bank debt is a choice. Figures 6 and 12 present some statistics
on the cross-sectional determinants of debt mix. Empirically, the best predictor of bond
debt is total debt: larger firms with more leverage are more likely to have a larger share
of bond debt. This is not surprising given that bond markets are designed to raise large
amounts of external finance, and bond issuance often exceeds amounts that are typically
raised from banks or syndicates of relationship lenders. Second, the share of bond debt
(as well as leverage) varies considerably across sectors, likely reflecting different liquidity
needs or asset characteristics. Even conditional on sector, there is a positive association
of bond debt, on the extensive as well as intensive margin, with fixed asset investment
(property plant and equipment) and cash; a negative association with profitability.
Finally, debt mix appears significantly sticky in the data, as shown in Figure 11 in the
Online Appendix. Moreover, its time series correlation with the monetary cycle is limited,
as shown below.
Nevertheless, the non-random assignment of bond debt creates an identification chal-
16Of course, firms can sign derivatives contracts to hedge interest risk if they so choose. However Ip-
polito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018) shows that many firms do not hedge their floating rate bank debt
in the United States.
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lenge that we discuss in detail in Section 3. The concern is that a firm’s response to mon-
etary policy is not driven by its bond debt directly, but indirectly by another channel that
is correlated with bond debt. The fact that we estimate the response to a monetary policy
shock helps to mitigate some of the identification concerns.17 In addition, the granularity
of our micro-data allows to include firm fixed effects that control for the time-invariant
propensity to issue bond debt and a set of firm controls that allow for time varying char-
acteristics for the issue of bond debt.
3 Empirical Methodology and Results
3.1 Identification
The key empirical difficulty that researchers face is that the stance of monetary policy
reflects current conditions and/or anticipated developments in the economy. More pre-
cisely, there are three identification challenges.
Monetary policy shocks: It is necessary to separate the expected from the unexpected
stance of monetary policy. The expected component of monetary policy is problematic as
it is correlated with many third factors driving firms’ decisions. To address this issue, we
use high-frequency movement in interest rates derivative around ECB announcements.
The approach posits that asset prices–here, OIS swap rates–reflect all publicly available
information before the monetary policy announcement and that the change in asset prices
reflect the newly revealed information. As the underlying of OIS swaps is the EONIA18,
the change in the OIS swap rate reflects the unexpected change at the short end of the
yield curve. Measuring the change in the OIS swap rate in a short time window around
the policy announcement, makes any change likely to be disproportionately affected by
an unexpected change in monetary policy.19
Firm outcomes: Even with well-identified monetary shocks, measuring firms’ re-
17The definition of a shock that we have in mind is that the change represents a martingale difference
sequence. In other words, the innovation in monetary policy in period t cannot be predicted based on the
t− 1 information set
18This is the counterpart to the effective federal funds rate in the U.S. Note also that the ECB target rate
and the EONIA have historically tracked each other closely as the ECB target rate can be understood as the
target that is intended to be implemented by open market operations.
19This approach has been used by Cook and Hahn (1989), Kuttner (2001), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005b),
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a).
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sponse to that shock is challenging. Indeed, many firm-level outcomes are reported at
much lower frequency that our intra-day monetary shock, for instance sales, investment
or employment. The necessary identifying assumption would be extremely strong as
it requires the monetary shock to be orthogonal to other economic forces that occur in
the reporting horizon. Moreover, these variables are typically slow-moving and react
very gradually to a change in policy, which amplifies this issue further. The scope of the
outcome variable is also limited by the well-documented small magnitude of monetary
shocks identified through high-frequency data (the standard deviation in our sample is
5.5 basis points).20
To address this challenge, to measure the cross-sectional response of firms, we use
daily changes in their stock price as our main outcome variable.21 Stock prices have the
advantage that they can be measured at a much higher frequency relative to other firm-
level outcomes. Moreover, stock prices are forward looking, which brings two additional
benefits. First, asset pricing theory posits that all previous information are incorporated
in prices; hence changes in prices reflect the effect of new information only. Second, stock
returns “capitalize” changes in the economic environment; thus, they capture both short-
term and long-term effects of monetary policy. The key identifying assumption in these
return regressions is that the monetary policy shock is orthogonal to other factors that
affect the stock returns on this day.22
Firm heterogeneity: Finally, even with well-identified monetary shocks and a good
firm outcome variable, a firm’s debt mix is not randomly assigned. The decision to access
bond or bank debt is a choice. This leads to a potential identification concern akin to an
omitted variable problem. The question is whether there is a covariate that both drives
debt mix and response to monetary policy.23
One prominent firm characteristic that comes to mind is total leverage. Leverage is a
strong predictor for bond debt exposure as well as a likely driver for the firm’s response to
monetary policy as leverage increases risk, sensitivity to interest rates and it’s potentially
20For a discussion see e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a)
21Daily changes in the outcome variable have become somewhat of a convention in the literature, see:
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005b), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a).
22The measurement of monetary policy shocks in a short time window also helps with identification;
only unaccounted factors that are correlated with the change in the swap rate in the short time window and
that affect the stock price can threaten identification.
23The theoretical literature at the intersection of debt mix and monetary policy is thin, and therefore
provides little definitive guidance.
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associated real frictions with debt financing (i.e. debt over-hang). We therefore include
leverage as a control in our main specification along with firm fixed effects that absorb
time-invariant firm characteristics. Furthermore, we control for additional time varying
observable balance sheet characteristics on which firms could select into bond and have
been found to drive the cross-sectional response to monetary policy in the United States
(Ozdagli, 2018; Ottonello and Winberry, 2018; Jeenas, 2018; Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-
Orive, 2018).
One might also be concerned about potential transmission channels of monetary pol-
icy that affect firms through consumer demand, labor supply or exchange rate move-
ments. These channels are often product type, production technology or market specific
and hence are likely to vary at the industry level.24 Therefore, we include controls that
interact the industry classification with monetary policy shocks.
Foreshadowing the results of the next section, these covariates seem to have limited
forecasting power in our setting, especially in comparison to debt mix. Admittedly, we
cannot rule that our estimates are free of any confounders, although the strength and ro-
bustness of the effect suggest that bond financing plays a specific role in the transmission
of monetary policy.
3.2 Firm-level stock market regressions
To understand the heterogeneity of the cross-sectional response and to shed light on the
transmission mechanism, we explore the richness of the micro-data. Specifically, we use
longitudinal data to estimate models of the form:
∆ logPi,t = αi + νt + γMPShockt ×Xi,t + δZi,t +MPShockt × Sectori + i,t (1)
The panel structure allows for a rich set of fixed effects and controls which act as a
defense against confounding factors. We use firm fixed effects, αi, as well as date fixed ef-
fects. νt. We also include time-varying firm level controls, Zi,t, from the balance sheet25; in
24Valuation ratios within industry tend to be strongly aligned and industry peers are often used for a
variety of benchmarking exercises.
25We used lagged balance sheet characteristics for two reasons. First, the majority of firms report at the
end of the calendar year. We want analysts and investors to observe the firm’s capital structure before
evaluating the impact of monetary policy on the firm. Second, lagging the controls can alleviate some of
the problems with bad controls as described by Angrist and Pischke (2008).
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the main specification these encompass cash-over-assets, earnings-over-assets, debt-over-
earnings, fixed assets-over-assets, and log market-to-book ratio. Importantly, we include
interactions of the firm’s sector with the monetary policy shock. This set of interactions
control for the sector specific sensitivity of firms to monetary policy. These interactions
act as a first defense against unobserved sector specific and time-invariant factors that
affect firms’ response; such as, a change in consumer demand, labor supply or exchange
rates.
The coefficient of interest is γ: it captures the heterogeneity in the treatment effect to
monetary policy associated with firms’ characteristic X . For γ 6= 0, characteristic X can
forecast the cross-sectional responses to monetary shocks and plausibly plays a role in the
transmission channel. In the analysis below, we first consider standard firm characteris-
tics from the balance sheet before focusing on the role of bond financing. Given our set
of controls and fixed effects, the coefficient γ is identified from within-day and within-
sector variation. A negative γ implies that firms with larger value of variable X respond
more strongly to a surprise monetary contraction relative to other firms in their sector
(remember that the average effect is negative), over and above the average response on
that particular day.
3.3 Results: the role of bond financing
Balance sheet characteristics: Table 4 shows how a wide array of firm characteristics pre-
dict the cross-sectional response to monetary shocks. In our setting, it appears that sim-
ple balance sheet items have limited forecasting power. While firm size has a detectable
effect, cash-over-assets, earnings-over-assets, debt-over-earnings, earnings-over-interest,
asset tangibility or market-to-book ratio do not.
The role of debt mix: On the other hand, the debt mix seems to be a strong driver of
firms’ response to monetary policy. Table 5 shows that firms with a larger share of bond
debt are robustly more affected by monetary shocks. Column 1 shows that leverage (mea-
sured by debt over assets) itself has as anticipated some predictive power. The bonds-
over-assets ratio also significantly increases firms’ sensitivity to interest rates shocks as
shown in column 2. The economic significance of this effect is not trivial. Following a one
percent point increase in interest rates, firms in the top quartile of the bonds over assets
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distribution have a 2.3 percentage point lower stock return relative to firms in the bottom
quartile. Column 3 and 4 confirm this result when estimated more non-parametrically,
by using a bond outstanding dummy and terciles of bonds-over-assets, respectively. Im-
portantly, columns 5 and 6 control for the firm total leverage and use levels and terciles
of bond debt-over-debt, respectively. These specifications also suggests that our findings
goes likely beyond a size effect, as leverage itself is strongly related to size. In both spec-
ifications, the share of debt raised through bonds is strongly significant, for a given level
of indebtedness. Column 7 shows that the effect on bonds-over-assets remains robust and
significant when including total leverage. It suggests some particularity about bond debt.
3.4 Additional Findings
Robustness: Additional robustness results are gathered in the Online Appendix. Table
12 shows that the main result is unaffected to excluding the outlier announcement of
September 17th 2001. Table 13 shows little change when observations are weighted by
assets or market capitalization, while Table 14 uses alternative monetary shocks based
on daily changes in the Euribor 1M or the daily changes of the OIS swap rate. Table 11
and table 15 shows that the main results are robust to the inclusion of rating dummies
that represent the rating categories and default probability as proxied by the "distance-
to-default" framework by Merton (1974) and subsequently adopted by, among others,
Gilchrist and Zakrajs˘ek (2012). We also check whether our main result is specific to the
constituents of the EURO STOXX indices. As an alternative to the preceding selection we
selected the top 500 firms by market capitalization in each year. This yields a broader
sample with 635 distinct firms. The main results are very similar in size and significance.
We have a slight preference for the sample based on the EURO STOXX indices as it has
a comparable size distribution to the historical constituents of the S&P 500 index in the
United States.
Relative prices and credit flows: A large class of models emphasizes that monetary
policy affects credit flows by altering the relative cost of different debt instruments—the
interest rate differential between bond and bank debt with the same maturity and same
creditworthiness of the borrower changes (Bolton and Freixas, 2006). Such a change can
have real effects as long as debt instruments are not perfect substitutes. It can alter firms’
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debt burden and induces change in equilibrium financing, investment or hiring policies
(Crouzet, 2017; De Fiore and Uhlig, 2015). Our findings could be explained by monetary
policy having a differential pass-through across debt instruments and, specifically, bonds
becoming more expensive relative to bank loans following a monetary contraction. This
would penalize bond-financed firms relatively more compared to firms with less bond
debt. In most existing models, such a change in relative prices would also drive new
bank debt issuance and a change in firms’ debt mix.
The evidence to support this pricing channel appears to be relatively weak. To begin
with, in the raw aggregate data it is difficult to detect a differential pass-through between
bank and bond debt pricing. Figure 9 displays corporate bond yields and interest rates on
bank loans across the monetary cycle. It is apparent that bond yields and loan rates follow
very similar trajectories as the ECB target rate changes. Nevertheless, aggregate data
cannot be used to reach definite conclusions, and so we turn to more careful analysis using
our time series of monetary shocks. However, bank interest rates are measured at a lower
frequency (monthly) relative to asset prices and potentially take time to adjust.26 At the
cost of stronger identification assumption, we use a local projection to trace out the change
in the interest rate differential between bank debt and bonds subsequent to a monetary
policy announcement. One thing to keep in mind is that the identified monetary policy
shocks are relatively small and, thus, provide limited statistical power.
Figure 7 provides suggestive evidence against the hypothesis that rate hikes make
bond debt more expensive relative to bonds. If anything, bank loans appears to have
a larger pass-through. Panels A and B shows that bank loans become more expensive
relative to bonds immediately following a monetary contraction, although the effect is
noisy and seems to revert after a few months. Panel C and D shows that firms adjust their
debt mix marginally toward bonds following a monetary contraction. The direction of
this effect is in line with existing evidence (Lhuissier and Szczerbowicz, 2018; Becker and
Ivashina, 2014). Note that we do not take a stance on why the pass-through of monetary
policy would be different across loans and bonds, and the empirical determinants of this
spread are still an open question (Schwert, 2018). Moreover, while the quantity effect
aligns with the price response, we cannot tell for sure that firms’ change in debt mix is
26We do no observe loan interest rate in the micro-data and, thus, have to resort to aggregate loan interest
rate as published monthly by the ECB.
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driven only by the change in relative spreads.
Effects on firm dynamics: To estimate the impact of monetary policy on firms over
time, we use local projection techniques, following Jordà (2005). The objective is to mea-
sure the adjustment path of slow-moving firm outcomes from balance sheet data. Keep-
ing the regression model close to our high frequency approach, we estimate the following
specification for horizons h ∈ {1, . . . , 8}:
∆yt+h,t = α + β
h
ShockMPShockt + t (2)
where ∆yt+h,t denotes the difference over h quarters in either log quarterly total assets,
log liabilities, log net property, plant and equipment, as well as log capital expenditures,
and α is a constant. As in similar studies (Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018); Cloyne, Fer-
reira, Froemel, and Surico (2018)), the monetary policy shocks is aggregated to a quarterly
frequency.
Figure 8 contains the estimated impulse response functions (IRFs) along with their
95% confidence intervals for all four outcome variables. In terms of magnitudes, a 25bp
contractionary monetary policy shock leads to assets shrinking over time by about 0.2%.
Similar reactions can be observed for total liabilities and net property, plant and equip-
ment (fixed assets), which suggests that companies are reducing their levels of investment
in response to tighter borrowing constraints, and serves as evidence for monetary non-
neutrality over horizons of up to two years. Those dynamic effects seem to dissipate and
become statistically insignificant toward the end of the horizon, yet they are still notable
given that measurement issues related to linking up high- and low-frequency variables
are bound to impede the analysis.
US sample: Ultimately, we are interested in setting up a unifying framework that
sheds light on the response of firms to monetary policy. It is often difficult to determine
empirically the exact channel through which firms are affected as one has to distinguish
between many competing hypotheses with limited moments in the data. One source of
additional variation is the use of an additional sample; in our case, the United States.
With the aim in mind to draw some conclusion, we constructed a sample analogous to
the sample in the Eurozone.
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We focus once again on the period between 2001 and 2007.27 We resort to the same
source for balance sheet data as in Europe; that is, Thomson Reuters Worldscope, to en-
sure comparable variable definitions. The construction of the monetary policy shock iden-
tified at high frequency is based on the (scaled) daily changes of federal funds futures at
FOMC announcement days and follows the seminal work of Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005b).28
Some interesting features arise from the comparison of the summary statistics between
the Eurozone and the United States. First, the size distribution between the two samples
are very similar based on the quartiles as shown in Table 6. Second, the overall bond debt
level is considerably lower in the Eurozone than in the United states as evidenced by a
median of 17% and 5%, respectively. Third, apart from the level difference between the
Eurozone and the United States, the bond debt over debt distributions show a glaring
difference: the bond debt over debt distribution is right skewed in the Eurozone whereas
left skewed in the United States. In other words, not only have firms in the United States
more bond debt they also tilt their financing mix heavily towards bond debt. For firms
in the Eurozone, in contrast, the 25th percentile is 0% and the 75th percentile 59%. This
finding is well known and mentioned here to the extent that it may help to interpret our
results. In contrast to the result in the Eurozone, Table 7 shows that the heterogeneity in
the response to monetary policy shock is systematically related to the firms’ cash holding,
earnings over interest, and fixed assets over assets.
Replicating the debt variable analysis in the United States, as shown in Table 8, ex-
hibits some surprising results at first. The amplified response to monetary policy shocks
by leverage and; in particular, bond debt financing, in the Eurozone turns in an attenu-
ated response. In other words, firms with higher leverage—whether financed by bank
debt or bond debt—respond less strongly to monetary policy shocks. There is a variety of
factors that can reconcile this finding. At this point, we want to postpone the discussion
on how these results can be reconciled to Section 4.5—after introducing the conceptual
27This is motivated by the relatively good coverage of the Capital IQ capital structure database after 2000
and the attempt to make the two samples comparable despite the lower number of event days due to the
lower meeting frequency of the FOMC.
28We checked the robustness of our main results with respect to the use of monetary policy shocks identi-
fied in a tight announcement window as done by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). In contrast to Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005b), Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) use only regularly scheduled FOMC meetings which
reduces the number of announcement days. The magnitude of the coefficient remains almost unchanged
but the statistical power decreases as consequence.
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framework.
4 An Organizing Framework
4.1 Overview
It is clear from the discussion above that there are many potential forces at play and
that interpreting the empirical evidence is not straightforward. This section therefore
presents a framework to understand conceptually what drives firms’ response to mone-
tary shocks. The objective is to nest three important forces. The first two, duration and
interest pass-through, are canon. The duration effect reflects the sensitivity of market val-
ues to changes in the discount rate, and central to the asset pricing literature (Gormsen
and Lazarus, 2019). Importantly, bonds and loans tend have different maturity and in-
terest rate fixation, hence different duration. Second, interest rate pass-through is key to
the (multiform) bank lending channel literature, which studies how the special character-
istics of banks affect how they pass on monetary shocks to their borrowers. Irrespective
of the specific mechanism, these theories suggest that bonds have a lower interest rate
pass-through relative to loans.
The third force is motivated by extensive work in corporate finance that stresses the
rigidity of bond debt relative to banks loans. Relative to banking relationships, market fi-
nancing is harder to renegotiate in bad times and leave firms more exposed to temporary
cash-flow shocks and the risk of financial distress (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Crouzet,
2017; Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli, 2016; De Fiore and Uhlig, 2015). This
key difference implies that debt composition can affect monetary transmission through a
more novel liquidity management channel: investment, debt and cash hoarding policies
are jointly determined in a forward-looking manner to avoid financial distress. Indeed,
corporate liquidity has been recently recognized a key force for monetary transmission
(Rocheteau, Wright, and Zhang, 2018; Kiyotaki and Moore, 2018; Altavilla, Burlon, Gian-
netti, and Holton, 2019).29 We use the framework to inform our empirical evidence in two
29To understand the way financial frictions affect large firms, a number of stylized facts suggest that
liquidity management is a more appropriate framework than simple models with binding one-period bor-
rowing constraints. Specifically, debt structure in the data is rich, in particular long-term debt constitutes
the lion’s share and includes both bonds and bank loans. In addition, debt adjustments are rare and of-
ten carefully planned Korteweg, Schwert, and Strebulaev (2019). Finally, retained earnings and cash are
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ways. First, we decompose the firms’ response to a change in interest rates as three terms
representing the duration, interest rate pass-through and liquidity management channel,
respectively. The decomposition holds for the stock price, as well as investment, liquid
assets and credit risk. Second, we use this decomposition to explain why the effect of
monetary policy can vary across firms with different sources of financing. The setup ex-
tend Holmström and Tirole (1998) to include legacy long-term debt and study how debt
rigidity influences firms’ investment policies jointly with their holdings of liquid assets.
4.2 Setup
A firm has a legacy project (assets in place) that pay cash flows in each period, long-
term debt obligations that must be paid in each period and legacy liquidity balance that
is available to withstand interim cash flow shocks. We model three dates explicitly: t=
0,1 and 2. Figure 10 illustrates the timeline. The last period t=2 summarizes all future
cash-flows. The existing assets in place generate a payoff stream for the firm with present
value PV E0 = PV A0 − PV D0, which is the difference between the all future cash-flows
and debt service payments. We allow the structure of these payoff streams to be arbi-
trary, and their duration (how their present value changes with discount rates) is the only
summary statistics needed for the analysis below. A t= 0, the firm has a new investment
opportunity. This new project generates a stream of cash-flows starting from t=2. An
amount I invested at t=0 generates a present value of R(I)PV I at t=2. Assume decreas-
ing returns to scale, so that R is increasing and concave. The term PV I summarizes the
temporal structure of the cash-flows and captures the new project duration, that plays an
important role in the analysis.30
Liquidity shock: Following Holmström and Tirole (1998), we model liquidity shocks
at the interim period t=1. We say the firm faces a liquidity shock if current financial
resources are too small relative to current debt service payments31. We model the source
of liquidity shock as a temporary cash-flow shock at t=1: pi1 can be unexpectedly low,
without any implication for terminal cash-flows.
typically the marginal sources of financing for new projects, not borrowing.
30For example, if the project pays a first cash-flow R(I) that grows a rate g every period and the discount
rate is ρ, R(I)PV I = R(I)/(ρ− g).
31Note the difference with solvency concerns in which the present value of all future cash flows is too low
relative to the present value of future debt services.
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Textbook models often take an extreme view in which this liquidity shock can lead to
default and bankruptcy: the firm is liquidated if income pi1 is below R1 if the firm takes
no preventive measures. In practice, liquidation are much less frequent than other types
"credit events" that are associated with liquidity problems. For instance, a temporary cash
flow shock can put a firm at risk of a rating downgrade, covenant violation or delinquen-
cies. We can therefore think of a credit event in a broad sense: if the ratio all current
financial resources over current debt service is below l ≥ 1, the firm incurs a dead-weight
loss and loses a fraction λ of all its current and future profits. This dead-weight loss can
be interpreted as the indirect costs of financial distress. The simplest case corresponds
to l = λ = 1: if financial resources are below debt service, the firm is liquidated with
no salvage value. For ease of exposition only, we focus on this simple case below. How-
ever, we stress that our framework is well suited to understand how firms manage their
credit rating or plan in advance to prevent covenant violations, over and above avoiding
conventional defaults.
The central question we study in this framework is the decision of firms to withstand
a liquidity shock in equilibrium. To withstand a liquidity shock, the firm has two sources
of additional funds. First, it raises p˜i from capital markets at t=1 (equivalently, renego-
tiate down debt obligation R1). However, this is unlikely to be enough to raise enough
liquidity to withstand all shocks because of two frictions, that are well understood in the
literature. The first is the lack of pledgeability of future cash flows, due for example to
moral hazard or lack of enforcement.
The second is debt rigidity which plays a crucial role in our comparison of bonds and
bank financing. Following a large temporary cash-flow shock, rather than let the firm en-
ter financial distress, it is often in the creditors’ best interest to renegotiate their claims or
let themselves be diluted by the issuance of new claims. However, renegotiation frictions
can create a "debt overhang" problem at the continuation stage. Indeed, existing creditors
might refuse to be diluted by new issuance or fail to coordinate on a mutually beneficial
renegotiation. This can explain why market debt, which is held by a dispersed investor
base, is more rigid relative to relationship banking (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996).32
32Tirole (2010) provides an overview. More explicit microfoundations for p˜i would go as follows. In a
frictionless world, the firm could raise at t=1 the entire present value of its future income. However, assume
that only a fraction 1 − θ can be pledged to investors, for example to preserve the insiders’ incentives to
work. Moreover, because of imperfect renegotiation only a fraction 1 − φ of pledgeable income can in fact
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The shortfall that cannot be covered by p˜i therefore has to be planned in advance,
and comes from the liquidity hoarded at t=0. Denote the legacy liquidity balance by L0.
Optimally the firm will not withstand all liquidity shocks. We will see that hoarding
liquidity is costly and hence the firm will sometimes incur a dead-weight loss. The firm
"continuation policy" is to choose a threshold pi∗ such that it withstand the liquidity shock
at t=1 only if interim cash-flows are large enough: pi1 > pi∗. The probability of a credit
event is thus F (pi∗). Because the firm can only raise p˜i from capital markets at t=1, it must
accumulate liquidity at t=0 of at least L = R1− pi∗− p˜i. For now, we assume for simplicity
that liquidity has no direct carry cost (i.e. the "liquidity premium" is zero). For simplicity,
we also assume that the firm always raises p˜i at t=1, although this can be generalized.
A t= 0, the firm decides how to invest in the new project. The key decision we want
to analyse is how much to keep inside the firm to withstand future liquidity shocks vs
how to invest in this project.33 The legacy project implies disposable income y0 at t=0 (i.e.
earnings after subtracting debt obligations and maintenance of legacy assets). Disposable
income is either invested in new project I or stored to increase the liquidity balance by
∆L such that I + ∆L = y0. That is the key real decision we want to study. When interest
rates increase, how does the scale of investment I in new project change? That is a way to
model the real effects of monetary policy through its effect on firms’ liquidity demand in
good times (i.e. "rating management").34 The firm chooses its optimal continuation policy
pi∗ at t=1 jointly with its investment I∗ and liquidity decision ∆L∗ at t=0. It maximizes its
expected payoff given two constraints:
max
pi∗,I∗,∆L∗
[1− F (pi∗)][PV E0 +R(I∗)PV I]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected terminal profits
+
∫
pi1≥pi∗
(pi1 −R1 + p˜i + L0 + ∆L)dF (pi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profits at t=1
+ y0 − I∗ −∆L︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits at t=0
s.t. R1 = pi∗ + p˜i + L0 + ∆L∗ and I∗ + ∆L∗ = y0
be raised. This leads to p˜i = (1 − θ)(1 − φ)× future income. The coefficients (θ, φ) measure the magnitude
of these two frictions.
33Implicitly, we assume that payout to shareholders are not optimal at t=0. This could be micro-founded
by the return on the new project is large enough. The setting is nevertheless easily extended to allow for
payouts. However, the core economic force we emphasize is: the question is how liquidity is "wasted" by
being kept inside the firm as opposed to invested or paid out for shareholders’ consumption.
34There is an implicit assumption that the new project cannot be financed with debt. This is not important:
the only thing needed is that pledgeability frictions prevent it to be entirely financed with debt, i.e. that cash
on hands is valuable to increase investment scale (Tirole, 2010)
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The first constraint says that there is just enough liquidity at t=1 to service debt in
the worst continuation scenario (pi1 = pi∗). The second is the accounting of cash-flows at
t=0. Inspecting the constraints reveal some intuition. First, when pi∗ is high, ∆L∗ can be
low: if the firm does not want to withstand many liquidity shocks, it does not have to
hoard much liquidity. Second, if pi∗ is high, I∗ can also be high: there is no need to hoard
liquidity and it invests more in new project.
Equilibrium Liquidity Demand and Investment: The trade-off behind the opti-
mal continuation policy pi∗ is also intuitive. Decreasing pi∗ (withstanding more liquidity
shocks) has the benefit of preserving the returns of the legacy project and the new project,
as the shareholders occur a dead-weight loss after a credit event. However, it necessitates
liquidity hoarding, which reduces the scale of investment of new project (opportunity
cost). The FOC implies the following optimality condition:
R′(I∗)PV I − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
net return of new project
=
f(pi∗)
1− F (pi∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hazard rate of credit event
[PV E0 +R(I
∗)PV I]︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss in case of credit event
This expression clearly summarize the intuition above: withstanding liquidity shocks
has an opportunity cost of investing less in the new project.
Bank vs. bond and liquidity demand: The model can nest some of the important
differences between bonds and bank financing. Bond debt is more "rigid" in the sense
that creditors are dispersed and might opposed a mutually beneficial renegotiation at the
intermediate stage t=1, either but blocking additional issuance via covenants or by oppor-
tunistically refusing to reduce or delay their debt obligations. In the model, that can be
formalized as a lower value of p˜i that can be raised at t=1 to withstand the liquidity shock.
Everything else equal, more bond financing implies larger liquidity risk. Larger liquidity
risk increases the value of hoarding liquidity at t=0 and therefore raise the opportunity
cost of investing in the new project. The following proposition summarizes the intuitive
difference in investment and liquidity demand across bank and bond financing:
Debt rigidity and liquidity management: When debt is more rigid (p˜i is lower), the firm
faces a credit event more often (pi∗ increases). Moreover, the firm increases its liquidity demand
and invests less in the new project (I∗ falls).
Effect of rising interest rates: Our key results decompose how firm’s value and op-
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timal behavior change when interest rates increase. In this setting, rates hikes affect firm
behavior in two ways. First through duration effects that change the present value of
shareholders’ equity akin to a discount rate channel prevalent in asset pricing.35 Second,
rate hikes create liquidity risk because they drain interim cash-flows, which is closer to
a cash flow channel prevalent in the banking or corporate finance literature. We have
purposely set up the model such that periods t=1 and t=2 play different roles and dis-
tinguish clearly between these two effects. Indeed, payoffs are deterministic at t=2, and
an increase in rates only reduces the present value of firm’s owners payoff, and does not
create liquidity risk. On the other hand, a change in intermediate debt service R1 come
with an increase in liquidity risk, which has more subtle implications. We will see that it
is clearer to separate this second effect in two components: interest rate pass-through and
liquidity management. The next sections decompose along these three forces the effects of
monetary policy on stock prices and real variables.
4.3 Stock Price Reaction to Monetary Policy
Duration gap: Monetary policy has an effect through this channel as long as it affects
the terminal value through discounting. The key variable behind the duration channel
of monetary policy is equity duration ∂PV E0/∂rf , which is nothing but the "duration
gap" between assets and liability ∂PV A0/∂rf − ∂PV A0/∂rf . Firms with larger duration
gap see their terminal payoff fall more after interest rates hikes relative to other firms.
For completeness, one should also include the duration of the new project cash-flows
R(I)∂PV I/∂rf , as they add to existing equity.
How does this duration channel helps to understand the differential response of bank-
and bond-dependent firms? For a given asset duration, bond-dependent firms have
larger debt duration, hence lower duration gap. This implies that bond-dependent firms
react less to interest rate changes. However, if bond-dependent have in fact larger du-
ration gaps (because their asset duration is significantly longer), this effect could be re-
versed.
Interest rate pass-through: In addition, a policy hike can also affect cash-flows to
the extent that it increases debt service payments, increasing liquidity risk. However,
35Equivalently, a "cost of capital" channel.
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the firm’s exposure to this channel depends on its debt structure: different debt instru-
ments have different "interest rate pass-through". This pass-through is at the core of ex-
isting views of the (multiform) bank lending channel of monetary policy. Classical views
emphasized the role of reserves or bank capital, while recent views have argued that
banks’ market power or loan covenants are quantitatively important (Drechsler, Savov,
and Schnabl, 2017; Wang, Whited, Wu, and Xiao, 2018; Greenwald, 2019). Independent of
their exact nature, because they rely on bank-related frictions, all these views suggest the
pass-through should be smaller for bond-dependent firms. In addition, Ippolito, Ozdagli,
and Perez-Orive (2018) document a "floating rate channel of monetary policy" that goes
in a similar direction. Bond debt is more likely to be fixed rate and long maturity, and that
mechanically dampens the increase in debt service following a rate hike relative to other
firms. However, recall the evidence that all firms have rich debt structure with significant
amount of short-term or floating rate debt, such that no firms is completely shielded from
rate hikes. Full hedging might also not be optimal or feasible.
In the model, this is equivalent to making different assumptions on how intermediate
debt service R1 moves with the risk-free rate. Denote this interest rate pass-through as
∂R1/∂r
f = ω ≥ 0. For multiple reason, bond-dependent have less interest rate pass-
through (smaller ω) relative to other firms, which would imply that bond-reliant firms
are less sensitive to monetary policy.
The shadow value of liquidity: To understand fully how monetary policy affects liq-
uidity risk, it is useful to define first the shadow value of liquidity (SV L). By definition
SV L := ∂Equity
∂y0
, where y0 is disposable income at t=0 (using legacy liquidity balance L0
instead is equivalent). Given that firms maximize equity value under the liquidity con-
straints, this shadow value can be computed directly using the envelope theorem :
SV L :=
∂Equity
∂y0
= (1− F (pi∗))R′(I∗)PV I
A key result is that, in equilibrium, the shadow value of liquidity is equal to the risk-
adjusted return on the new project. That’s intuitive: the new project is the opportunity
cost of every dollar of liquidity hoarded at t=0. In equilibrium, firms that face greater
liquidity risk have a larger shadow value of liquidity. Indeed, they invest less and, due to
decreasing returns to scale, have higher marginal return on investment.
Decomposing stock price reaction: Given that firms maximize their equity value
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given constraints, the stock price reaction to a change in interest rates can be computed
directly using the envelope theorem:
∂Equity
∂rf
= (1− F (pi∗))
{
∂PV E0
∂rf
+R(I∗)
∂PV I
∂rf
− ∂R1
∂rf
R′(I∗)PV I
}
The first two terms inside the bracket reflect the duration gap channel above. Because
firms need to manage their liquidity, there is an additional effect, coming from the fact
that, given pi∗, interest rate R1 constraints investment I∗. The last term is just the product
of interest rate pass-through ω = ∂R1
∂rf
and the shadow value of liquidity defined above
(SV L). We therefore have the general identity for stock price reaction to monetary policy:
∂Equity
∂rf
= duration gap− interest rate pass-through× shadow value of liquidity
The stock price reaction is larger for firms that have a higher shadow value of liquidity.
The response to monetary policy is thus larger for firms with higher debt rigidity ceteris
parebus. That can explain our high-frequency findings that bond-dependent firms are
more affected by monetary policy.
In general, this decomposition makes clear that there are two mitigation forces. For a
given asset duration, bond-dependent firms have larger debt duration, hence lower dura-
tion gap. This implies that bond-dependent firms react less to interest rate changes. How-
ever, if bond-dependent have in fact larger duration gaps (because their asset duration is
significantly longer), this effect is reversed. Second, existing views of the bank lending
channel (bank capital, market power, floating rate loans) also emphasize that bond debt
has a lower interest rate pass-through relative to loans.
4.4 Real Effects
In this section, we decompose the real effects of monetary policy through its effect on opti-
mal liquidity management and investment. We follow the logic on the previous analysis,
and study sequentially the duration and liquidity effects, before combining them.
The duration effect of monetary policy can be modeled as a fall of the present value of
the firm’s final payoff. This payoff has two components: new project PV I and the existing
legacy project PV E0. First, rate hikes reduce PV I leading to a standard "cost of capital"
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channel: a fall in the project value reduces investment demand. Moreover, there is an
additional effect working through the change legacy project PV E0. It can be understood
as a standard "default option” logic. A lower firm’s payoff in the case of continuation
reduces the incentives to hoard liquidity at t=0. The effect on investment depends on our
assumptions on payouts at t=0. With our simplifying assumption that the firm does not
payout at t=0, investment would increase because it is the only alternative to liquidity
hoarding. However, in a more comprehensive model, the reduced incentives to hoard
liquidity would translate in the firm increasing its payout instead of investment. In total,
both components of the duration channel therefore go in the same intuitive direction:
investment falls following a rise in interest rates.
The second channel is that rate hikes drain cash-flows and make the firm more ex-
posed to temporary shock at t=1. Naturally, an increase in intermediate debt service R1
implies that more liquidity needs to be hoarded at t=0, at the expense of the new project.
We therefore get an intuitive liquidity channel of monetary policy in which rates hikes
lead to a rise in liquidity demand and a fall in investment. Combining both forces, we
can decompose the change in investment from monetary policy as follows:
∂I
∂rf
=
∂I
∂PV I
∂PV I
∂rf
+
∂I
∂PV E0
∂PV I
∂rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
duration
+
∂I
∂R1︸︷︷︸
liquidity management
× ∂R1
∂rf︸︷︷︸
interest rate pass-through
The liquidity management channel therefore amplifies the standard cost of capital
channel.
Credit risk and liquid assets: On the other hand, the effect on the firm credit risk
is not as straightforward as one could initially believe. Recall that the probability of a
credit event is F (pi∗) which is simply the probability that intermediate cash-flows are
below the continuation threshold pi∗ chosen by the firm in equilibrium. The liquidity
constraint at t=1 implies that credit risk depends on both investment and interest rates
since pi∗ = I∗ + R1 − y0 − L0 − p˜i. The credit risk of the firm therefore only increases
if I∗ + R1 increases. In other words, investment must fall less than one for one with
intermediate debt service.
When taken on its own, the liquidity channel indeed implies that rate hikes increases
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credit risk.36 The intuition is a follows. Since a credit event is costly, the firm endoge-
nously reduces investment in order to tamper the rise in credit risk coming with a rate
hike. Nevertheless, the project has positive marginal returns, which implies that there is
a trade-off and the firm in equilibrium decides to let its credit risk rise by not fully cutting
back on investment. However, credit risk rises much less relative to a setting in which in-
vestment scale is fixed and liquidity management taken to be exogenous. In other words,
the prudent behavior of firms tampers the rise in credit risk. It is therefore key to ac-
count for the fact that investment and liquidity management are determined jointly and
endogenously.
However, once the additional effect of duration and interest rate pass-through are
taken into account, the total effect on credit risk is less clear. Indeed, the duration ef-
fect reduces investment, which on its own reduces credit risk. Moreover, a low interest
rate pass-through reduces liquidity risk, and thus credit risk. In principle, it is possible
that these forces dominate and that credit risk falls if investment falls drastically after a
rate hike. For the similar reasons, the dynamics of liquid assets following rate hikes are
not straightforward. While additional liquidity risk increases incentives to hoard liquid
assets, the duration effect goes in the opposite direction: the present value of future cash-
flows falls, making continuation less valuable and reducing incentives to hoard liquid
assets.
The role of debt rigidity: How does the rigidity of debt mediate the real effects of
monetary policy? Intuitively, one would expect that firms with more rigid debt reduce
investment more following a rate hike because they are more exposed to liquidity risk.
Mathematically, one can show that the liquidity management component of the invest-
ment response ∂I
∂R1
is increasing in:
∂
∂pi∗
f(pi∗)
1− F (pi∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
slope of hazard rate
[PV E0 +R(I
∗)PV I]︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss in case of credit event
If the hazard rate is convex, the intuition holds. Firms with rigid debt have higher
credit risk, which implies that there their hazard rate rises fast with interest rates for a
given investment level. They thus have stronger incentives to reduce investment rela-
36It can be shown that ∂I∂R1 is below one in absolute value.
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tive to other firms. Everything else equal, we therefore expect stronger real effects for
bond-reliant firms. However, as before duration and interest-rate pass-through represent
mitigating forces. Following a rate hike, bond-reliant firms face a larger fall in the market
value of their liabilities and a smaller increase in their intermediate debt payments.
The differential effect on credit risk across firms with different debt composition is
however much less clear. As noted above, it is possible that credit risk endogenously
falls in the face of a rate hike. It is also possible that, since their investment response is
potentially larger, bond-dependent firms experience a fall in credit risk relative to other
firms, rather than an increase.
4.5 Discussion
Low-frequency response: The last section shows that interpreting some of the low-
frequency response can be difficult without the lens of a model. Whether a certain type
of firms are "more responsive" to monetary policy is not always unambiguous: real in-
vestment, credit risk or stock price can respond in different proportions. Predicting the
relative difference across groups, such as in a typical difference-in-difference framework,
is not easy: the sign might flip depending on which outcome is considered. For example,
after a rate hike, all firms withstand fewer liquidity shocks, but bond-dependent firms
moderate this increase by more strongly reducing their investment in new projects. Their
credit spreads might therefore increase less relative to bank-financed firms, although their
investment falls relatively more. The joint endogeneity of investment and liquidity man-
agement is a key economic force that complicates the interpretation of purely reduced-
form evidence.
Other channels of monetary transmission: Our framework was purposefully stark
in order to illustrate clearly the role of liquidity management and debt rigidity for mon-
etary transmission. We acknowledge that the framework could be extended in multiple
directions. For instance, we take the empirical evidence at face value and simply assume
that monetary policy moves real interest rates (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018b) with-
out explicitly modeling pricing frictions and inflation dynamics. Moreover, monetary
policy is known to affect the liquidity premium on money-like assets (Drechsler, Savov,
and Schnabl, 2018; Rocheteau, Wright, and Zhang, 2018) while our framework assumes
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that this premium is fixed at zero. However, allowing the liquidity premium to vary
with policy only makes the liquidity management response larger: the cost of building
a liquidity buffer is even higher, which reduces resources available for new investment
in good times. Similarly, we abstract from explicit general equilibrium effects caused by
monetary tightening but some of these effects only amplify our channel. For instance,
rate hikes can depress consumer demand and reduce firms’ earnings, which only exacer-
bates the liquidity management problem. Note also that, while their general equilibrium
model is much richer than our framework, Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2016) also empha-
size that, quantitatively, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the investment
response of firms. Finally, Ottonello and Winberry (2018) shows that credit spreads on
new financing endogenously react to firm’s investment policy through default risk. Our
framework assumes that long-term debt is in place and that the marginal source of financ-
ing is retained earnings, but new debt issuance at intermediate stages could be added to
capture this additional force.
Equilibrium debt composition: In our analysis, we take a firm’s debt structure as
given and provide comparative statics results with respect to debt rigidity. In principle,
the debt composition could be endogenized in a first stage for completeness. A promis-
ing direction is to follow Crouzet (2014), whose model predicts a mixed debt structure
composed of both bonds and loans for a majority of firms, as in the data, while endog-
enizing investment scale. The two frictions in his setting are also at heart of our model:
financial distress incurs a deadweight loss and loans are easier to renegotiate relative to
bonds. There is also evidence that firms actively manage their maturity and refinancing
decisions (Mian and Santos, 2018), a margin that we do not model explicitly.
Comparing the Eurozone with the United States: What can explain the difference
between the Eurozone and the United States? Our framework offers some possible leads
in understanding this difference. The model makes two main predictions where differ-
ences may originate from: (i) difference in duration and (ii) differences in rigidity. There
is some evidence that the debt securities’ characteristics differ between the Eurozone and
the United States: Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018) shows that the overwhelm-
ing share of bank debt is floating rate for firms in the United States. Vickery (2008) shows
that this is particularly true for large firms—as the ones in our sample. In the core of the
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Eurozone, in contrast, the predominant share of bank debt is fixed-rate.37 In addition,
the distribution of bond debt maturities is shifted rightwards implying longer average
bond maturity. These two facts suggest that the duration difference between bond and
bank debt may partly explain some of the observed difference. In fact, Table 8 column 7
suggests that the positive effect is stronger and more significant for bond leverage. The
following thought example illustrates what role the maturity difference plays. For two
firms with a given asset duration, the bank financed firm exhibits a large duration mis-
match, whereas the bond financed firm is exposed to a smaller duration gap and hence
less affected by interest rate shocks; the difference in sensitivity is picked up by the co-
efficient on the share of bond debt. Finally, the larger development of bond markets and
rating agencies in the United States might have lead to lower rigidity of market debt rel-
ative to Europe in the same period. While this is suggestive evidence, it appears possible
to reconcile the results of the two samples within a single framework.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of firms’ debt composition for the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy in the Eurozone. Using stock price reactions to identified monetary
policy shocks, firms with more bond debt are disproportionately affected by unexpected
ECB interest rate changes. This pattern is difficult to rationalize with existing theories of
the bank lending channel, as well as with explanations based on duration. We therefore
present an organizing framework to decompose the response of large firms. We argue that
the rigidity of outstanding bond debt, as emphasized in models of bank versus market
financing, matters for monetary transmission via corporate liquidity management. Rate
hikes drain cash-flows and increase exposure to temporary shocks. Firms react by being
prudent in good times, and reduce investment in favor of hoarding liquid assets. Because
bonds are harder to renegotiate in bad times relative to relationship banking, this effect
can rationalize our main finding.
This is a large scope for future research to understand better the macroeconomic im-
plications of firms’ debt composition. Sources of external financing are not perfect substi-
tutes and the underlying trade-offs affect the pass-through of monetary policy. We also
37cf. ECB Statistical Data Warehouse: Risk Assessment Indicators
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highlight the role of the stock of long-term debt outstanding. Monetary policy does not
only change credit flows, it also importantly interacts with characteristics of existing debt
contracts.38 Finally, policy is naturally path-dependent: existing debt structure is driven
by past financing patterns, which are in turn driven by past policies. After quantitative
easing and a long period of low long-term interest rates, a large share of economy now
borrows from the bond market, a trend that influences conventional interest rate policy
going forward.
38This also appear to be an important component of monetary transmission through household debt.
For instance, Auclert (2019), Di Maggio, Kermani, Keys, Piskorski, Ramcharan, Seru, and Yao (2017) and
Garriga, Kydland, and Šustek (2017) emphasize the role of the stock of long-term fixed rate mortgages.
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2
3
4
5
EC
B
 ta
rg
et
 ra
te
 (i
n 
%
)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Figure 1 – ECB Target Rate
Note: Figure plots the ECB policy rate for the main refinancing operations (MRO) as decided by the Governing Coun-
cil. Source: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html
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Figure 2 – Time Series of MP Shocks
Note: Identified monetary policy shocks from OIS swaps (in basis points) for the sample horizon-January 2001-July
2007 at monetary policy announcements dates.
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Figure 3 – Firm Financing in Europe vs. Other Countries
Note: Source is Langfield and Pagano (2016)
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Figure 4 – Distribution of Firm Financing
Note: The sample is an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone
indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007.
Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope and bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum.
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Figure 5 – Mix of Firm Debt Liabilities
Note: The sample is an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone
indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007. The
subsamples "No bond debt", "Low bond debt" and "High bond debt" to corresponds to the terciles of the bonds-
over-assets ratio, recalculated every year. The figure display the median of each ratio. Balance sheet data comes from
Worldscope and bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum.
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Figure 6 – Bond Debt and Firm Characteristics
Note: This figure presents summary statistics for an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO
STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days
between 2001 and 2007. Each subfigure plots the median debt-over-assets and bonds-over-assets ratio for firms in each
deciles of the following firm characteristics (left to right, top to bottom): log assets, cash-over-assets, EBITDA-over-
assets, fixed assets-over-assets, market-to-book and debt-over-EBITDA. The deciles of each variables are calcualted
over the entire sample. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum,
and stock market information comes from Datastream.
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Figure 7 – Monetary Policy Shocks and Price and Quantity of Bank vs. Bond Debt
Notes: The panels show estimates from a local projection following Jordà (2005). Panel (a) and (b) uses
monthly times series data for which following baseline model is estimated ∆yt+h,t = α+βhShockMPShockt+
ΓXt + ut; where ∆yt+h,t denotes the difference over h months, α is a constant, and Xt contains multiple
lags of the dependent variable. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval for the parameter
estimates with Newey-West standard errors to account for overlapping observations. Panel (c) and (d) uses
panel-data on the firm-time level. We follow the extension of the local projection method by Mian, Sufi,
and Verner (2017) and estimate following model: ∆yi,t+h,t = αi+βhShockMPShockt+uit; where ∆yi,t+h,t is
the difference over h quarters of the firm specific outcome variable, αi is a firm fixed effect, and MPShockt
is the monetary policy shock in time t. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The dashed lines
indicate the 95% confidence interval for the parameter estimates.
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Figure 8 – Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks
Notes: The panels show estimates after a contractionary shock from a local projection following Jordà
(2005). All panels use quarterly times series data for which following baseline model is estimated
∆yt+h,t = α + β
h
ShockMPShockt + t; where ∆yt+h,t denotes the difference in outcomes over h quarters
and α is a constant. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval for the parameter estimates with
Newey-West standard errors to account for overlapping observations. Each number along the solid line
counts the observations included in the regression at various horizons.
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Figure 9 – Debt Yields across Monetary Cycle
Note: The figure plots the raw data for the ECB target rate (Source:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html), the
average loan rate in the Eurozone as published by the ECB (Source: https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/ quick-
view.do?SERIES_KEY=124.MIR.M.U2.B.A2A.J.R.1.2240.EUR.N) and yields to maturity for bond portfolios
with remaining maturity of 5yr and BBB and AA rating (Source: Bloomberg BFV 5yr EUR Eurozone Industrial
BBB Bond Yield and BFV 5yr EUR Eurozone Industrial AA Bond Yield)
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N Mean SD Min Max
Panel A: Market Returns (in pp)
MP announcement days
∆ MSCIEMU 92 -0.032 1.37 -4.16 3.12
∆ DAX30 92 -0.094 1.68 -4.65 5.08
∆ IBEX35 92 0.040 1.36 -3.78 4.22
∆ CAC40 92 -0.096 1.49 -5.25 3.77
∆ FTSEMIB 92 -0.080 1.31 -3.47 3.28
Other days
∆ MSCIEMU 1631 0.004 1.26 -6.53 6.17
∆ DAX30 1631 0.016 1.57 -8.87 7.55
∆ IBEX35 1631 0.028 1.24 -5.99 5.79
∆ CAC40 1631 0.004 1.37 -7.68 7.00
∆ FTSEMIB 1631 0.000 1.20 -7.87 7.63
Panel B: Shocks (in bps)
MP announcement days
∆ OIS 92 -0.047 5.49 -39.25 15.00
∆ EURIBOR 1M 92 -0.000 5.80 -41.80 15.40
∆ OIS (daily) 92 -0.127 5.30 -37.75 10.00
Other days
∆ OIS 1626 -0.141 2.94 -74.50 20.50
∆ EURIBOR 1M 1631 -0.041 1.30 -11.30 10.80
∆ OIS (daily) 1623 -0.036 1.50 -11.75 15.50
Table 1 – Summary Statistics Returns and Shocks
Note: Summary statistics for the market returns of a broad market index (MSCIEMU), national blue chip indices
for Germany (DAX30), Italy (FTSEMIB), Spain (IBEX35), France (CAC40) and shocks derived based on OIS swaps
and money market instruments in the sample period January 2001-July 2007.
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Panel A: Market Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ MSCIEMU ∆ DAX30 ∆ IBEX35 ∆ CAC40 ∆ FTSEMIB
∆ OIS -5.148∗∗ -5.843∗ -5.132∗∗ -5.580∗∗ -1.467
(1.893) (2.625) (1.789) (2.069) (2.041)
R2 0.043 0.036 0.043 0.042 0.004
Observations 92 92 92 92 92
Panel B: Industry Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ Food ∆ Health ∆ Media ∆ Techn. ∆ Telecom ∆ Autoparts ∆ Basic Mat.
∆ OIS -5.649∗∗ -2.545+ -8.563+ -6.195 -9.650∗∗ -5.242∗ 0.176
(1.088) (1.524) (4.410) (5.148) (2.536) (2.506) (1.679)
R2 0.086 0.009 0.079 0.013 0.086 0.033 0.000
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Panel B: Industry Regressions Continued
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
∆ Construc. ∆ Basic Res. ∆ Chemicals ∆ Oil and Gas ∆ Industrials ∆ Utilities ∆ Industrial Serv.
∆ OIS -0.849 6.601+ -2.432 -4.521∗∗ 1.145 -4.736∗∗ 2.604
(1.239) (3.473) (2.091) (1.349) (1.441) (1.342) (2.097)
R2 0.002 0.057 0.010 0.025 0.003 0.041 0.011
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Table 2 – Stock Price Index Reaction to MP Shocks
Note: This table reports regression estimates of daily returns of the market index / super-sector index on the monetary policy shock in the sample period
January 2001-July 2007 at monetary policy announcement dates. All variables are expressed in percentage terms. Market regressions use a broad mar-
ket index (MSCIEMU), national blue chip indices for Germany (DAX30), Spain (IBEX35), France (CAC40), and Italy (FTSEMIB). Industry regressions
use the EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone Indices; they contain between 10 and 30 firms from the corresponding supersector. The estimated model is
∆Rt = α + β × MPShockt + ut. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity. +,*,** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level,
respectively.
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mean p25 p50 p75 count
No bond debt
Assets (in bn) 5.752 1.391 2.798 5.894 5152
Cash over assets 0.0641 0.0184 0.0384 0.0787 5152
Earnings over assets 0.163 0.101 0.142 0.230 5152
Fixed assets over assets 0.239 0.0888 0.188 0.343 5152
Market-to-Book 4.315 1.889 3.061 5.467 5152
Debt over earnings 1.532 0.319 1.367 2.603 5152
Earnings over interest expenses 32.37 6.118 11.53 28.68 5152
Debt over assets 0.220 0.0675 0.182 0.318 5152
Debt due within year over debt 0.456 0.210 0.391 0.680 5152
Bond debt over assets 0.00160 0 0 0 5152
Bond debt over debt 0.0206 0 0 0 5152
Low bond debt
Assets (in bn) 20.33 4.130 9.685 19.49 4135
Cash over assets 0.0515 0.0213 0.0369 0.0632 4135
Earnings over assets 0.135 0.0854 0.129 0.179 4135
Fixed assets over assets 0.277 0.115 0.260 0.399 4135
Market-to-Book 2.535 1.383 2.112 3.011 4135
Debt over earnings 2.043 1.127 1.811 2.755 4135
Earnings over interest expenses 14.01 6.348 10.24 16.43 4135
Debt over assets 0.231 0.160 0.202 0.302 4135
Debt due within year over debt 0.331 0.171 0.302 0.470 4135
Bond debt over assets 0.0702 0.0389 0.0655 0.104 4135
Bond debt over debt 0.365 0.171 0.336 0.524 4135
High bond debt
Assets (in bn) 28.46 4.615 11.44 37.23 4581
Cash over assets 0.0649 0.0212 0.0377 0.0738 4581
Earnings over assets 0.116 0.0911 0.123 0.159 4581
Fixed assets over assets 0.287 0.151 0.270 0.410 4581
Market-to-Book 2.580 1.240 2.013 3.186 4581
Debt over earnings 2.260 1.895 2.648 3.966 4581
Earnings over interest expenses 9.421 4.586 7.047 11.36 4581
Debt over assets 0.373 0.276 0.347 0.448 4581
Debt due within year over debt 0.245 0.128 0.218 0.342 4581
Bond debt over assets 0.230 0.152 0.205 0.274 4581
Bond debt over debt 0.627 0.476 0.638 0.782 4581
Total
Assets (in bn) 17.60 2.538 6.389 16.27 13868
Cash over assets 0.0606 0.0204 0.0377 0.0719 13868
Earnings over assets 0.139 0.0920 0.131 0.182 13868
Fixed assets over assets 0.266 0.111 0.233 0.390 13868
Market-to-Book 3.211 1.414 2.358 3.779 13868
Debt over earnings 1.925 0.963 1.962 3.114 13868
Earnings over interest expenses 19.32 5.381 9.280 15.92 13868
Debt over assets 0.274 0.162 0.257 0.361 13868
Debt due within year over debt 0.349 0.157 0.292 0.482 13868
Bond debt over assets 0.0975 0 0.0544 0.153 13868
Bond debt over debt 0.324 0 0.259 0.586 13868
Table 3 – Firms Balance Sheet Summary Statistics
Note: The table presents summary statistics for an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO
STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days
between 2001 and 2007. The subsamples "No bond debt", "Low bond debt" and "High bond debt" to corresponds to
the terciles of the bonds-over-assets ratio, recalculated every year. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond
issuance data comes from SDC Platinum, and stock market information comes from Datastream.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MP Shock × Log assets -0.913∗∗∗
(0.142)
MP Shock × Cash over assets -4.315
(8.053)
MP Shock × Earnings over assets 5.686
(10.12)
MP Shock × Debt over earnings -0.0277
(0.0619)
MP Shock × Earnings over interest expenses -0.0151
(0.00977)
MP Shock × Fixed assets over assets -0.939
(2.079)
MP Shock × Log Market-to-Book -1.011
(1.550)
R2 0.227 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226
Date FE X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X
Observations 13868 13868 13868 13868 13868 13868 13868
Table 4 – Balance Sheet and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 1 using different balance sheet characteristics as
interacted variable X . The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti,
Duarte, and Mann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO
STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements
days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks
interactions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding quarter): log assets, cash over assets, earnings
over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance
sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes
from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the
0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MP Shock × Debt over assets -5.803∗∗∗ -3.805∗ -4.028∗ -1.267
(1.882) (2.104) (2.110) (1.701)
Debt over assets -7.562 -7.063 3.331
(29.18) (29.35) (26.99)
MP Shock × Bond debt over assets -14.89∗∗∗ -13.95∗∗∗
(3.237) (3.456)
Bond debt over assets -29.93 -31.54
(37.04) (36.30)
MP shock × Bond Issued -1.403∗∗∗
(0.533)
Bond outstanding -10.90
(7.136)
MP Shock × Tercile of bond debt over assets -0.970∗∗∗
(0.251)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -3.848
(4.529)
MP Shock × Bond debt over debt -4.690∗∗∗
(1.583)
Bond debt over debt 0.895
(14.30)
MP Shock × Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.004∗∗∗
(0.380)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -0.655
(5.009)
R2 0.226 0.227 0.226 0.226 0.227 0.226 0.227
Date FE X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X
Observations 13868 13868 13868 13868 13868 13868 13868
Table 5 – Debt Financing and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 1 using different measures of bond debt as inter-
acted variable X . The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte,
and Mann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX
Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between
2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and
time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding quarter): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over
earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from
Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01
level, respectively.
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mean p25 p50 p75 count
No bond debt
Assets (in bn) 14.59 2.458 5.669 14.50 6794
Cash over assets 0.166 0.0471 0.107 0.246 6794
Earnings over assets 0.152 0.0992 0.159 0.229 6794
Fixed assets over assets 0.239 0.111 0.184 0.305 6794
Market-to-Book 4.079 2.120 3.216 5.423 6794
Debt over earnings 1.112 0.216 0.706 1.374 6794
Earnings over interest expenses 39.87 10.86 25.10 55.09 6794
Debt over assets 0.139 0.0507 0.114 0.192 6794
Debt due within year over debt 0.285 0.0225 0.170 0.452 6794
Bond debt over assets 0.0475 0 0.0370 0.0875 6794
Bond debt over debt 0.459 0 0.419 0.861 6794
Low bond debt
Assets (in bn) 17.64 3.602 7.445 16.72 6767
Cash over assets 0.0917 0.0225 0.0563 0.125 6767
Earnings over assets 0.147 0.102 0.152 0.198 6767
Fixed assets over assets 0.312 0.154 0.255 0.405 6767
Market-to-Book 3.514 1.905 2.828 4.214 6767
Debt over earnings 1.848 0.995 1.506 2.195 6767
Earnings over interest expenses 13.12 6.450 10.31 16.14 6767
Debt over assets 0.242 0.183 0.229 0.274 6767
Debt due within year over debt 0.160 0.0262 0.106 0.237 6767
Bond debt over assets 0.169 0.144 0.170 0.198 6767
Bond debt over debt 0.756 0.611 0.800 0.950 6767
High bond debt
Assets (in bn) 19.94 3.825 8.196 18.05 6733
Cash over assets 0.0832 0.0159 0.0387 0.103 6733
Earnings over assets 0.143 0.0896 0.141 0.185 6733
Fixed assets over assets 0.350 0.183 0.309 0.516 6733
Market-to-Book 3.650 1.608 2.674 4.434 6733
Debt over earnings 2.733 1.617 2.394 3.713 6733
Earnings over interest expenses 8.419 3.801 6.234 9.587 6733
Debt over assets 0.375 0.290 0.353 0.431 6733
Debt due within year over debt 0.141 0.0208 0.0915 0.210 6733
Bond debt over assets 0.317 0.254 0.294 0.358 6733
Bond debt over debt 0.861 0.770 0.909 0.978 6733
Total
Assets (in bn) 17.38 3.231 7.094 16.44 20294
Cash over assets 0.114 0.0234 0.0629 0.155 20294
Earnings over assets 0.147 0.0970 0.150 0.204 20294
Fixed assets over assets 0.300 0.143 0.242 0.419 20294
Market-to-Book 3.749 1.860 2.920 4.635 20294
Debt over earnings 1.895 0.782 1.515 2.540 20294
Earnings over interest expenses 20.52 5.555 10.19 21.29 20294
Debt over assets 0.252 0.154 0.246 0.335 20294
Debt due within year over debt 0.195 0.0234 0.111 0.281 20294
Bond debt over assets 0.178 0.0783 0.170 0.254 20294
Bond debt over debt 0.691 0.527 0.796 0.957 20294
Table 6 – US Firms Balance Sheet Summary Statistics
Note: The table presents summary statistics for an unbalanced panel of the firms that were included in the S&P500
between 2001 and 2007, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 62 FOMC announcements days between
2001 and 2007. The subsamples "No bond debt", "Low bond debt" and "High bond debt" to corresponds to the terciles
of the bonds-over-assets ratio, recalculated every year. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data
comes from SDC Platinum, and stock market information comes from Datastream.
52
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MP Shock × Log assets 0.0456
(0.399)
MP Shock × Cash/assets -20.88∗∗
(8.883)
MP Shock × Earnings/assets 1.411
(3.889)
MP Shock × Debt/income -0.120
(0.261)
MP Shock × Earnings/interest -0.0562∗∗
(0.0257)
MP Shock × Fixed assets/assets 11.14∗∗
(4.491)
MP Shock × Log Market-to-Book 0.806
(0.525)
R2 0.277 0.283 0.277 0.277 0.280 0.279 0.277
Date FE X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X
Observations 20275 20275 20275 20275 20275 20275 20275
Table 7 – US Balance Sheet and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 1 using different balance sheet characteristics as
interacted variable X . The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are the (scaled) daily changes in
the federal funds future as constructed in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005b). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel
of the American firms that were part of S&P 500 index, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 62 Federal
Open Market Committee announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed
effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding quarter):
log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over
assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum
and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level.
*,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MP Shock × Debt/assets 9.949∗∗ 8.738∗∗ 5.741
(4.333) (3.990) (4.525)
Debt/assets 45.49 40.47 28.00 16.93
(47.34) (45.33) (41.63) (49.01)
MP Shock × Bonds/assets 11.03∗∗∗ 7.008∗
(4.118) (3.744)
Bonds/assets 57.59 41.02
(42.05) (43.50)
MP shock × Bond Issued 5.151∗∗∗
(1.560)
Bond Issued (dummy) 22.48
(14.72)
MP Shock × Tercile of bonds/assets 1.976∗∗
(0.776)
Tercile of bonds/assets 1.796
(4.210)
MP Shock × Bonds/debt 3.763∗∗∗
(1.374)
Bonds/debt -0.0120
(10.52)
MP Shock × Tercile of bonds/debt 1.636∗∗∗
(0.567)
Tercile of bonds/debt 0.691
(3.414)
R2 0.279 0.279 0.280 0.279 0.280 0.279 0.279
Date FE X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X
Observations 20275 20275 20275 20275 20275 20275 20275
Table 8 – US Debt Financing and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 1 using different measures of bond debt as inter-
acted interacted variableX . The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are the (scaled) daily changes
in the federal funds future as constructed in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005b). The sample consists of an unbalanced
panel of the American firms that were part of S&P 500 index, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 62
Federal Open Market Committee announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects,
date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding
quarter): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed
assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC
Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and
date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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Figure 11 – Bond origination over time
Note: The figure shows aggregate statistics of the capital structure / origination volume in the sample from 2001-
2007. Bond origination over assets is the total bond origination volume in one year over total assets of all firms in
the corresponding year. Firms’ debt over assets (individual leverage) and bond debt over assets (individual market
leverage) are asset-weighted in each year.
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(1) (2) (3)
return return return
MP Shock -1.014 -4.328∗∗ -4.772∗∗∗
(1.581) (1.914) (1.794)
Log assets -10.39 9.870 13.61
(20.52) (29.98) (29.57)
Cash over assets -87.89 -162.2∗ -212.5∗
(88.77) (83.51) (118.4)
Earnings over assets -52.87 19.84 -3.452
(78.07) (85.32) (130.3)
Fixed assets over assets -44.62 33.27 -104.8
(80.01) (103.6) (105.9)
Log Market-to-Book 42.84∗ 53.55∗ 46.88
(22.45) (30.91) (35.95)
Debt over earnings 0.0750 0.249 -0.0580
(0.270) (0.559) (0.297)
Earnings over interest expenses -0.0348 -0.144 -0.126
(0.0678) (0.139) (0.191)
R2 0.019 0.039 0.027
Firm FE X X X
Firm controls X X X
Observations 13868 13868 13868
Table 9 – Average effect of MP Shocks
Note: This table presents estimated coefficients for estimating a regression in which the dependent variable is daily
stock return and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018). Column 1 uses no weights,
Column 2 weights observations by market capitalization and Column 3 by book assets. The sample consists of an
unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding
financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm
fixed effects and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding quarter): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over
assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet
data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from
Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1,
0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
return return return return return
MP Shock × Bond debt over assets -14.89∗∗∗ -12.75 -14.55∗ -14.42∗
(3.237) (9.753) (8.050) (8.001)
Bond debt over assets -29.93 -25.68 -22.68 -21.33
(37.04) (44.93) (44.59) (44.10)
MP Shock × ST debt over assets -4.110
(3.913)
ST debt over assets 6.772
(53.10)
MP Shock × LT debt over assets -6.533∗∗∗
(2.179)
LT debt over assets -9.993
(31.02)
MP Shock × Share of bond debt due before 1y -5.578
(7.180)
Share of bond debt due before 1y -23.08∗
(12.45)
MP Shock × Share of bond debt due before 2y -2.682∗
(1.553)
Share of bond debt due before 2y -6.290
(8.410)
MP Shock × Share of bond debt due before 3y -2.121
(1.858)
Share of bond debt due before 3y 0.355
(7.167)
R2 0.227 0.226 0.241 0.241 0.241
Date FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X
Observations 13868 13868 9627 9627 9627
Table 10 – Debt Maturity and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 1 using different measures of bond debt as inter-
acted variable X , adding a measure of the maturity of bond debt. The dependent variable is daily stock return, and
MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of
the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities.
Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed
effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding quarter):
log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over
assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum
and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level.
*,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
return return return return
Unrated ×MP Shock 1.922∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗ 0.614∗ 0.445
(0.268) (0.295) (0.353) (0.517)
High Yield ×MP Shock 2.618 3.046 2.690 2.709
(3.447) (3.040) (2.995) (3.154)
IG below AA ×MP Shock 0.858 1.782∗∗ 1.252∗ 1.039
(0.616) (0.776) (0.691) (0.674)
IG AA and above ×MP Shock 0 0 0 0
(2.09e-15) (2.91e-08) (5.49e-08) (2.23e-08)
High Yield -7.323 -4.301 -6.916 -6.489
(12.43) (12.38) (12.35) (12.21)
IG below AA 7.807 9.216 7.825 8.319
(8.464) (8.265) (8.179) (8.206)
IG AA and above -2.712 -1.982 -2.838 -2.505
(9.814) (9.572) (10.28) (10.26)
MP Shock × Bond debt over assets -16.67∗∗∗ -4.491∗∗ -4.557∗∗
(4.254) (1.837) (1.843)
Bond debt over assets -30.62 -6.351 -5.793
(36.36) (29.56) (29.26)
MP Shock × Bond debt over debt -5.013∗∗
(1.966)
Bond debt over debt 0.496
(14.30)
MP Shock × Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.133∗
(0.593)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -0.985
(4.984)
R2 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227
Date FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm controls X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X
Observations 13792 13792 13792 13792
Table 11 – Rating Categories and MP Shocks
Note: Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 1 using different measures of bond debt as
interacted variableX , adding interactions with rating categories (High Yiedl is the excluded category). The dependent
variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018). The sample
consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices,
excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls
include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm controls
(all lagged to preceding quarter): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings
over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, credit
rating comes from Capital IQ, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes
from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the
0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
58
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
return return return return return return
MP Shock × Debt over assets -7.117∗∗ -5.034 -5.574 -1.006
(3.304) (3.753) (3.738) (3.485)
Debt over assets -5.227 -5.167 -4.817 4.572
(29.41) (29.88) (29.57) (26.56)
MP Shock × Bond debt over assets -18.70∗∗∗ -17.96∗∗∗
(3.966) (4.858)
Bond debt over assets -24.06 -26.48
(38.30) (36.53)
MP Shock × Tercile of bond debt over assets -0.971∗∗
(0.455)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -3.055
(4.542)
MP Shock × Bond debt over debt -5.004∗
(2.806)
Bond debt over debt 2.645
(14.58)
MP Shock × Tercile of bond debt over debt -0.961
(0.746)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -0.231
(5.059)
R2 0.229 0.230 0.229 0.230 0.229 0.230
Date FE X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X
Observations 13733 13733 13733 13733 13733 13733
Table 12 – Excluding Sept 17th 2001
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 1 using different measures of bond debt as in-
teracted variable X , excluding Sept 17th 2001. The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are
constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European
firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include
91 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007 (excluding Sept 17th 2001). Controls include firm fixed effects,
date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding
quarter): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed
assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC
Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and
date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
return return return return return return return return
MP Shock × Bond debt over assets -15.30∗∗∗ -8.132∗∗∗ -8.493∗∗∗ -17.12∗∗∗ -9.436 -12.52∗∗∗
(2.384) (2.492) (2.273) (3.466) (6.409) (4.503)
Bond debt over assets -8.087 -48.46 -46.71 12.92 -107.1∗∗ -101.9∗∗
(29.58) (35.25) (34.62) (41.82) (47.52) (43.62)
MP Shock × Tercile of bond debt over assets -2.094∗∗∗ -1.547∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.495)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -2.959 2.494
(4.132) (6.182)
MP Shock × Bond debt over debt -4.753∗∗∗ -6.305∗∗∗
(1.214) (2.324)
Bond debt over debt 12.68 32.33∗
(11.98) (18.93)
MP Shock × Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.577∗∗∗ -1.150∗
(0.374) (0.613)
Tercile of bond debt over debt 2.412 9.653∗
(6.555) (5.802)
R2 0.351 0.351 0.352 0.352 0.350 0.349 0.351 0.350
Date FE X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X X X X X
Observations 13868 13868 13868 13868 13868 13868 13868 13868
Table 13 – Weighted Regressions
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 1 using different measures of bond debt as interacted variable X , weighing observations by
market capitalization (Columns 1 to 4) or book assets (Columns 5 to 8). The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti,
Duarte, and Mann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices,
excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects,
sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding quarter): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt
over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes
from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
return return return return
MP Shock (EURIBOR) × Bond debt over assets -13.07∗∗∗
(2.617)
Bond debt over assets -28.73 -29.02
(36.30) (36.01)
MP Shock (EURIBOR) × Tercile of bond debt over assets -0.898∗∗∗
(0.227)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -3.830 -3.931
(4.537) (4.565)
MP Shock (OIS) × Bond debt over assets -11.92∗∗∗
(3.384)
MP Shock (OIS) × Tercile of bond debt over assets -0.679∗
(0.395)
R2 0.227 0.226 0.226 0.226
Date FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm controls X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X
Observations 13868 13868 13868 13868
Table 14 – Other MP Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 1 using different measures of bond debt as inter-
acted variable X , using alternative measures of monetary policy shock. The dependent variable is daily stock return,
and MP Shock are constructed as daily change in EURIBOR 1M contracts (columns 1 and 2) or daily changes in OIS
1M rate (columns 3 and 4). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO
STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days
between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interac-
tions and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding quarter): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over
assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet
data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from
Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1,
0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
61
(1) (2) (3) (4)
return return return return
MP Shock × Bond debt over assets -15.28∗∗∗ -13.10∗∗∗
(3.116) (3.705)
MP Shock × Default probability (KMV) 4.792 5.015
(5.289) (5.467)
Bond debt over assets -33.41 -29.19
(37.85) (36.87)
Default probability (KMV) 33.55 34.90
(31.36) (32.37)
Quartile Default=1 ×MP Shock 3.981∗ 4.315∗
(2.342) (2.204)
Quartile Default=2 ×MP Shock 2.371∗∗ 2.702∗∗∗
(1.001) (0.999)
Quartile Default=3 ×MP Shock 0.390 0.452
(0.995) (1.018)
MP Shock × Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.047∗∗∗ -0.832∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.260)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -4.053 -3.561
(4.658) (4.581)
R2 0.228 0.229 0.228 0.228
Date FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm controls X X X X
Sector-MP Shock interactions X X X X
Observations 13595 13595 13595 13595
Table 15 – Distance-to-Default and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 1 using different measures of bond debt as in-
teracted variable X , adding a measure of the default probability. The default probability is derived according to the
“distance-to-default” framework by Merton (1974) and subsequently adopted by, amongst others, Gilchrist and Za-
krajs˘ek (2012). The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are constructed as in Corsetti, Duarte,
and Mann (2018). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX
Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days between
2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and
time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding quarter): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over
earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from
Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum and stock market information comes from Datastream.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01
level, respectively.
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Figure 12 – Debt-over-assets (dark grey) and Bonds-over-assets (light grey) by Sector,
Country and Rating
Note: This figure presents summary statistics for an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO
STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 92 ECB announcements days
between 2001 and 2007. Each subfigure plots the average debt-over-assets (dark grey) and bonds-over-assets (light
grey) ratio for firms in each group. The first panel sorts on sector, the second panel on country of incorporation and the
third panel on S&P rating. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond issuance data comes from SDC Platinum,
credit rating data comes from Capital IQ and stock market information comes from Datastream.
63
